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DIVERGENCE IN LAND USE
REGULATIONS AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS
CHRISTOPHER SERKIN*
INTRODUCTION
For the past century, property rights-and in particular development
rights-have been circumscribed and largely defined by comprehensive
local land use regulations. As any student of land use knows, zoning across
the country shares a common DNA. Despite their local character, zoning
limits on development rights in almost every American jurisdiction share a
deep family resemblance borne from their common origin in the Standard
Zoning Enabling Act ("SZEA"). Zoning for much of the twentieth century
therefore converged around a core goal of separating incompatible uses of
land as a kind of ex ante nuisance prevention.1 Of course, zoning went
much farther than the common law of nuisance, but its animating
justification was to minimize the externalized impacts of certain kinds of
intensive development.
For decades, zoning created a relatively stable and predictable system
defining development rights and also neighbors' expectations about what
could be built nearby. While municipalities innovated on the margins, the
shared approach meant that developers could easily assess the developable
envelope and permissible uses for any property, and many became
sophisticated at navigating local zoning ordinances to maximize
development potential. This also resulted in equally stable political
dynamics. By and large, developers and conservative property rights
advocates were allies in opposing restrictive zoning, while community
*. Elizabeth H. & Granville S. Ridley, Jr. Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Christina
Jeffcoat provided excellent research assistance.
1. For the seminal Supreme Court case recognizing the utility of zoning in this area, see Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-89 (1926).
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groups and pro-regulation liberals advocated for zoning to protect
community character, in-place residents, and the environment.
2
More recently, however, zoning has been changing. Even first
principles are up for grabs, and land use regulations increasingly diverge
from each other. Some municipalities today deploy zoning as a framework
for bargaining with developers. 3 Others focus on sustainable development,
housing affordability, community preservation, and many other goals.4 The
proliferation of new zoning goals means that property and development
rights may now be strikingly different between jurisdictions. This is a
period of increasing divergence in the substantive content of development
rights across municipalities.
This trend towards divergence in land use regulations has not,
however, resulted in the wholesale jettisoning of traditional approaches to
zoning and land use regulation. In fact, while the goals may increasingly
diverge, zoning's fundamental tools remain fairly consistent. Instead of
wholesale divergence in zoning and development rights, what we are
actually witnessing more closely resembles multimodal convergence,
where zoning regimes coalesce around multiple points instead of a single
goal.5
The question here is whether this divergence is beneficial on balance.
Any divergence has its costs, primarily in the form of increased
information costs for property owners and the deadweight costs of
increased special interest group rent seeking. But it comes with benefits,
too, as diversity in land use goals allows consumers to select their preferred
set of property rights. Too little divergence and people are locked into
regimes they may not want. Too much and information costs may grow too
high.
Increasing divergence--or multimodal convergence-also explains
2. Christopher Serkin, The New Politics of New Property and the Takings Clause, 42 VT. L.
REV. 1,3-6,13 (2017).
3. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 95, 332-33 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing
revenue related purposes of zoning and "dealmaking" by local governments); Carol M. Rose, Planning
and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 879
(1983) (discussing local governments' desire to retain flexibility to bargain ad hoc with developers).
4. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 114-15, 121, 328, 858 (discussing local governments'
ability to zone for more purposes than originally anticipated in the SZEA and examples of local
governments that use zoning to achieve sustainability, affordability, and preservation goals); see also
Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59
MD. L. REV. 464,464-65 (2000) (discussing various municipal land use goals); Serkin, supra note 2, at
6-7 (comparing differing political attitudes toward environmental zoning versus rent regulations).
5. Thanks to Professor Edward Cheng for labeling the phenomenon of multimodal convergence.
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some of the new political fights around zoning and property rights.
Traditional conservative and liberal positions have become unsettled as
progressives have increasingly blamed zoning for the affordability crisis in
many cities.6 Some liberal groups, however, continue to embrace restrictive
zoning because they prioritize environmental or community-preservation
concerns or favor mandatory inclusionary zoning as a better response to
affordability.7 Simultaneously, conservative suburbs that had previously
rejected land use regulations in favor of a pro-growth agenda have had
second thoughts and are deploying strict new limits on development partly
to constrain the burden on congestible infrastructure like roads.8 In short,
restrictive zoning and strong property rights are no longer at opposite ends
of a single spectrum. Making sense of zoning's new landscape requires
grouping land use regulations as focusing primarily on one of several
different possible goals. These include, among others, affordability,
environmental protection, aesthetics, historic preservation, community
protection, fiscal concerns, and more invidious exclusion. Sometimes these
are competing goals, and sometimes they are simply orthogonal to each
other. This Article identifies the range of goals that local governments
today pursue through zoning and then examines the costs and benefits of
this new zoning reality.
I. ZONING'S COMMON ORIGIN
In our fragmented and diverse political system, the consistency of land
use regulations between municipalities may seem surprising. In fact,
however, zoning everywhere in the United States shares a common-and
familiar--origin in the Standard Zoning Enabling Act ("SZEA").9
Promulgated in 1926 by the Department of Commerce, the SZEA was
6. See Conor Friedersdorf, San Francisco 's Self-Defeating Housing Activists, ATLANTIC (Dec.
29, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/san-fi-anciscro-is-confused-about-the-
villain-thats-making-it-unaffordable/422091; Ilya Somin, Why More Liberal Cities Have Less
Affordable Housing, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/02/more-liberal-cifies-have-less-affordable-housing/?utm ter
m=.b355844b719a. See generally Vicki Been, City NIMBYs, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217 (2018)
(exploring increasing "Not In My Backyard" ("NIMBY") policies in cities and the resulting effect on
urban housing costs).
7. Serkin, supra note 2, at 14-15.
8. See Emily Badger, The Bipartisan Cry of 'Not in My Backyard', N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/upshot/home-ownership-nimby-bipartisan.html; Mike
Rosenberg, Housing Construction in Local Suburbs Is at Historic Lows, While Seattle Is Setting
Records, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/business/real-estate/king-county-suburbs-slow-
their-housing-growth-canceling-out-seattle-building-boom (last updated Aug. 11, 2018, 12:49 AM).
9. A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, rev. ed. 1926).
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designed as model legislation for states to adopt that would empower local
governments to enact comprehensive zoning and land use regulations.'
0
The approach was a success. Following a tacit blessing by the Supreme
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,'1 almost every state in the
country adopted some version of the SZEA within the ensuing decades, and
zoning became ubiquitous. 12
From that origin story comes a common set of concerns that zoning
was meant to address. Zoning has long been seen as a kind of ex ante
nuisance prevention. 13 It separated incompatible uses of land before they
arose, keeping factories out of residential neighborhoods during the
urbanization and industrialization of the early twentieth century.14 And it
protected single-family homes from more intensive uses, in effect
stratifying much of the country into single-use zones. This had a pernicious
underbelly, reinforcing divisions based on class and on race, keeping
apartment buildings and other forms of multifamily housing out of more
affluent single-family zones.15 Indeed, this is zoning's original sin.16 But
this is also the fundamental justification that the Supreme Court endorsed
10. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulation, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1232-33 (2009) (briefly describing the history of the SZEA and citing sources on
the topic).
11. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926).
12. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 3, at 848-49 & n. 29 (briefly describing history of zoning in the
United States).
13. See, e.g., Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1724 (2015)
("[Z]oning laws restrict development before it results in unwanted burdens on neighbors, while
nuisance suits impose liability after the damage has begun."); G. Donald Jud, The Effects of Zoning on
Single-Family Residential Property Values: Charlotte, North Carolina, 56 LAND ECON. 142, 142
(1980) ("One of the principal purposes of municipal zoning ordinances is to protect property owners
from the deleterious external effects that may arise when incompatible land uses exist within the same
neighborhood."); Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings
Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 588 (1990) ("As land resources
became more developed, we progressed from a regime of 'anything goes' with one's landed property, to
a regime of post hoc judicial control on 'nuisances,' to a regime of legislatively defined, ex ante
regulation."); Mariana Valverde, Taking 'Land Use' Seriously: Toward an Ontology of Municipal Law,
9 LAW TEXT CULTURE 34, 52 (2005) (identifying a "religion of incompatible land uses that was
codified in the 1916 New York City zoning ordinance").
14. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-91 (analogizing a town's ability to prevent industry from
building in residential areas to the law of nuisances).
15. See Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924) (stating that
the true purpose of separating single-family residences and apartment buildings was to further economic
class divisions), rev'd 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Richard H. Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 597, 613-14 (2001) (discussing how the Supreme Court's language in Euclid's
majority opinion created a negative, stereotypical image of apartment buildings, validating zoning as a
way to segregate based on race and class).
16. Christopher Serkin, Capitalization and Exclusionary Zoning, INTERDISC. CTR. HERZLIYA
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5) (on file with author).
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in Euclid 17
Political fights emerged quickly. The mainstream arguments were not
over the project of zoning, but instead over its implementation. Few people
objected to the idea of using regulations to separate genuinely incompatible
land uses. Indeed, the regulatory goal of minimizing externalities was
consonant with both liberal and conservative convictions. But zoning's
contours have been contested now for a long time. By and large,
conservatives objected to regulatory restrictions on property rights and so
have advocated for limited zoning that separates only the most conflicting
uses. Others on the right have advocated for even more extreme regulatory
minimalism, relying on private land use controls instead of zoning and
invoking covenants and homeowners' associations as remedies for
regulatory overreach. 18 Liberals, on the other hand, embraced zoning. They
were willing to take a more capacious view of the harms of neighboring
uses and so promoted increasingly fine-grained land use regulations.' 9 The
conventional understanding of attitudes towards zoning could therefore be
presented along a simple spectrum from anti-regulation to pro-regulation.2 0
Slowly over time, local governments moved beyond these narrow goals.
Today, the underlying goals of many land use regulations have nothing to
do with ex ante nuisance controls.
II. DIVERGENCE IN THE PURPOSES OF LAND USE REGULATION
Local governments have become increasingly creative about pursuing
a variety of municipal goals through land use regulations, and zoning has
become concomitantly more nuanced and sophisticated. The result is a
more complex regulatory apparatus that owners must navigate to develop
property in many jurisdictions. It has also resulted in widening fissures in
the political fights over zoning. Although not always noticed, even by local
officials and developers let alone by courts and scholars, the presumptive
17. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-97 (discussing the effects of
apartment buildings on single-family residences and concluding that as apartments come very near to
being nuisances, it is within a municipality's police powers to exclude them from single-family
residential areas); see also Chused, supra note 15, at 614.
18. The intuition appears to be that burdens imposed by voluntary associations, like the private
govemance of a homeowner's association, are preferable to public regulatory authority. It is not
obvious why that should be since people can choose their local governments just as they can choose
their residential subdivisions. For early endorsement of more but not exclusive reliance on nuisance
law, see Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 682-83, 761-62 (1973).
19. See Serkin, supra note 2, at 6-7, 13.
20. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 14-16, 18 (2001) (comparing "growth
machine" jurisdictions with "homevoter" jurisdictions).
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conservative opposition to land use regulations and liberal support has, in
many cases, flipped.21 Odd political alliances dot the landscape of local
land use disputes, with-for example-affordable housing advocates
working alongside for-profit developers to resist restrictive zoning
ordinances.
From a distance, the divergence in local uses of zoning creates what
appears to be real instability. When the dispute over zoning was framed
simply in terms of more versus less regulation, the stakes were predictable
and relatively clear. But now with governments pursuing many different
goals in their land use regulations-with apparent divergence in the
purposes of zoning-this area of law appears quite chaotic.
Municipal land use regulations no longer converge around the central
organizing goal of minimizing conflicting uses of property (if they ever
truly did). This is not, however, a story of entirely disorganized divergence.
The proliferation of goals still relies for the most part on conventional
zoning tools, even if these tools are deployed somewhat differently. What
one therefore observes, looking carefully, is multimodal convergence in
land use controls. And identifying those various points of convergence can
go a long way to discerning patterns in-and understanding the political
stakes of-zoning fights wherever they occur. The first step, however, is to
survey the many goals that land use regulations today can serve and how
local governments tend to pursue them.
Many of the specific objectives are by now familiar. Scholars already
distinguish between growth machine and homevoter jurisdictions. 22
Advocates for sustainable development clash with NIMBYs ("Not in My
Backyard") and BANANAs ("Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near
Anything") and are joined by California's new YTMBYs ("Yes in My
Backyard"). 23 It is easy to observe these fights on the ground and to see
21. For some recognition of these changes, see Been, supra note 6, at 219-23; Serkin, supra note
2, at 13-16.
22. See Been, supra note 6, at 218 (noting that cities have traditionally been viewed as "growth
machines" and suburbs as favoring NIMBY policies to protect "homevoter" property values).
23. See Edward H. Ziegler, Sustainable Urban Development and the Next American Landscape:
Some Thoughts on Transportation, Regionalism, and Urban Planning Law Reform in the 21st Century,
42 URB. LAW. 91, 92-99 (2010) (discussing the NIMBY's opposition to sustainable development); Ben
Lockshin, Beyond NIMIBY: Understanding Different Affordable Housing Advocates and Detractors
(Part 1), GREATER GREATER WASH. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://ggwash.org/view/64879/beyond-nimby-
understanding-different-affordable-housing-advocates-detractors (discussing the differences between
NIMBYs and BANANAs); Alana Semuels, From 'Not in My Backyard' to 'Yes in My Backyard',
ATLANTIC (July 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/yimby-groups-pro-dev
elopment/532437 (discussing the rise of YIMBY views in California in response to the need for high-
density housing).
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how much jurisdictions can diverge in their land use priorities. But instead
of seeing these as one-off battles or through the realpolitik lens of interest-
group conflicts, it is worth stepping back and canvassing the range of goals
that local governments today pursue through their land use regulations.
Looking broadly, modem land use regulations often represent an
effort to pursue one or more of the following goals. These are not mutually
exclusive. Some are congruent with each other, but others are in
inextricable tension. Many implicate a voluminous academic literature.
They are presented here in only their most cursory outlines. The value of
this Article is not in the exhaustive explication of any particular land use
goal but instead in a broad survey of many of them together to identify the
resulting content of the land use regulations that each of these goals tends
to produce. What begins to emerge is a sense of real divergence in the
objectives that local officials pursue through land use regulations, the
implementation of which nevertheless converges around a few key zoning
tools.
A. MINIMIZING HARMS FROM NEIGHBORS
Minimizing conflicting uses of property is the original justification for
zoning, and conventional land use tools are well-suited to this goal by
separating residential, commercial, and industrial uses. Debates persist over
what counts as incompatibility and what sorts of externalized harms need to
be regulated.24 Nevertheless, this overarching goal-and the resulting
approach to zoning-are straightforward. Indeed, this objective continues
to dominate land use regulation in many suburbs, where residents continue
to protect low-intensity residential development by minimizing incursions
of more intensive uses.
25
24. See generally Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1
(2003) (discussing the effects of changing morals, technology, and scientific understanding on land use
regulations); William A. Fischel, The Law and Economics of Cedar-Apple Rust: State Action and Just
Compensation in Miller v. Schoene, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 133 (2007) (concluding that the government
should regulate land uses that harm uses with higher commercial values).
25. See Wayne Batchis, Enabling Urban Sprawl: Revisiting the Supreme Court's Seminal Zoning
Decision Euclid v. Ambler in the 21st Century, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 373, 379-80 (2010)
(explaining that the single-use zoning structure exists in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions); Nicole
Stelle Gamett, Save the Cities, Stop the Suburbs?, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 192 (2006),
http://yalelawjoumal.org/forum/save-the-cities-stop-the-suburbs (discussing the persistence of single-
use zoning in suburbs).
2019] 1061
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B. NEW URBANISM AND MIXED USE
In many other areas, however, the traditional view of incompatible
uses has broken down. People increasingly seek mixed uses and walkable
neighborhoods, preferring that vibrancy to single-use residential areas. 26
New urbanism champions these land use goals.2 7 New urbanists may still
accept at least implicitly the goal of separating incompatible uses, but they
adopt a very different view of what counts as incompatible.
New urbanist land use regulation therefore looks quite different from
conventional Euclidean zoning. The regulatory regime still regulates land
uses and development density, but it seeks vibrant and diverse uses instead
of homogenous ones. In addition to some rigid use districts, then, it permits
forms of mixed-use development. 28 Some zoning ordinances do this
explicitly, predesignating certain zones for mixed use buildings. 29 Others
do this through overlay districts or through special exceptions and
variances.3" The result is mixing more intensive and commercial uses with
residential ones, often on arterial streets or in places located near mass
transit.
C. ENCOURAGING GROWTH
Following Professors Harvey Molotch and William Fischel, land use
literature has long divided municipalities into "growth machine" and
"homevoter" jurisdictions. 31 The former seek to attract development and
mobile capital and to encourage investments in new local developments.
But this can be further subdivided into a number of different specific
26. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Rebirth of the Neighborhood, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1595,
1596-97 (2013) (arguing that new urban residents seek vibrant, mixed-use neighborhoods).
27. Doris S. Goldstein, New Urbanism-Planning and Structure of the Traditional
Neighborhood Development, 17 PROB. & PROP. 9, 9 (2003) ("New Urbanism is a land planning
philosophy advocating compact, mixed-use, pedestrian-friendly development.").
28. See id. at 10 (discussing how new urban developments separate residential and commercial
sections but also allow a mixture of uses in residential sections).
29. For an example of explicit mixed-use zoning, see SEASIDE, FL., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.
158, no. 83-10 (1983); Samantha Salden, The Seaside Code: The Poster That Started It All, SEASIDE
RES. PORTAL, https://seaside.library.nd.edu/essays/the-code (last visited May 11, 2019) (discussing the
Seaside Code as the first application of new urbanism in a form-based code).
30. Brian W. Ohm & Robert J. Sitkowski, The Influence of New Urbanism on Local Ordinances:
The Twilight of Zoning?, 35 URB. LAW. 783, 785 (2003) (comparing flexible techniques such as overlay
zoning to the rigidity of single-use districts); Scott B. Osborne, Planning Issues in Mixed-Use
Developments, 21 PRAc. REAL EST. LAW. 29, 30 (2005) (discussing new urbanist zoning through
conditional use permits and special zoning designations).
31. FISCHEL, supra note 20, at ix, 15-16; Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine:
Towarda Political Economy of Place, 82 Am. J. SoC. 309,309-10 (1976).
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motivations. Most obviously, as the "growth machine" name implies, this
pro-development attitude can reflect a straightforward desire to benefit the
local development community. Builders, architects, realtors, lawyers,
bankers, and others all have a strong financial interest in increased
development activity.3 2 Others favor growth for its own sake. A growing
city feels dynamic and vibrant, even as it puts pressure on existing
communities. 33 Still others are more instrumental, favoring growth for the
increased economic activity that it sometimes produces and also for the
services and amenities that size brings, whether a restaurant, professional
sports team, or symphony, to name just some of the most obvious
examples.
34
Whatever the specific reason, this pro-growth agenda translates into a
broad hostility to strict land use regulations. Municipalities that impose
onerous regulatory hurdles are at a competitive disadvantage when it comes
to attracting development and will expect to see development activity
decrease, all else being equal. The resulting approach to zoning is therefore
to minimize regulatory hurdles in order to encourage growth.
D. DISCOURAGING GROWTH
The opposite goal is also commonplace: discouraging growth. Just as
some people seek growth for the amenities it brings, others may object
because of increasing congestion or changes in municipal character that can
accompany substantial new development.35 It can also come simply from
status quo bias.
36
32. S. Rodgers, Urban Growth Machine, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN
GEOGRAPHY 40, 41-42 (Rob Kitchin & Nigel Thrift, eds., 2009) (describing the property investors,
developers, financiers, etc. that make up the growth machine).
33. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ENSURING
EQUITABLE NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: GENTRIFICATION PRESSURES ON HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 5-6
(2016), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Insights-Ensuring-Equitable-Growth.pdf
(discussing the burdens of rapid urban growth on existing communities).
34. See William K. Jaeger, The Effects of Land-Use Regulations on Property Values, 36 ENVTL.
L. 105, 112-17 (2006) (discussing how land use decisions can increase property values and "amenity"
benefits); see, e.g., Scott Cohn, New Insights on How Cities and States Stack Up in the Race to Win
Amazon's $5 Billion HQ2, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/05/new-clues-on-how-cities-stack-
up-in-the-race-to-win-amazons-hq2.html (last updated July 10, 2018, 7:42 PM) (explaining that
Amazon's criteria for new headquarters includes an area with more than one million people and urban
locations that can attract and retain talent).
35. See Michelle Shortsleeve, Challenging Growth-Restrictive Zoning in Massachusetts on a
Disparate Impact Theory, 27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 361, 380 (2018) (describing how municipalities use
zoning to limit population growth, and thus constrain congestion and preserve community aspects).
36. Eric A. Cesnik, The American Street, 33 URB. LAW. 147, 173-84 (2001) (discussing how
metropolitan planning is constrained by the status quo or the existing look and function of the area).
2019] 1063
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Again, whatever the specific motivation, the anti-growth agenda
embraces zoning and land use regulations of all kinds. The clearest
regulatory strategy to preserve the status quo is to erect as many regulatory
hurdles as possible to prevent new development. Strict zoning
requirements, including designating large areas of a municipality as
effectively off-limits for development, are the most obvious techniques.
37
But adding new layers of regulation can be equally if not more effective.
One study has demonstrated that every new regulation reduces building
permits for multifamily units by 6%.38 Historic preservation rules, strict
subdivision ordinances, development impact fees, and so forth can also
create an atmosphere hostile to development that drives growth elsewhere.
E. ZONING FOR TAX REVENUE
Zoning is increasingly bound up with issues of municipal finance.
Sometimes this is direct, like using regulatory concessions as opportunities
to raise money or develop infrastructure. 39 But more often, this is indirect,
like using zoning to encourage land uses that have net positive budget
impacts. Public schools, in particular, are often the largest expense for local
governments and therefore drive land use decisions.
40
While normatively controversial, local governments often seek to
exclude affordable housing because low-income households generate
relatively little revenue and yet place significant burdens on municipal
budgets through impacts on schools and other municipal services. On the
flip side, local governments seek land uses that generate substantial tax
revenue while creating few costs.41 Depending on the nature of the tax
base, this often means seeking to attract high-valued homes for people with
few if any school-aged children.
Traditionally, these dynamics have produced large-lot zones, limits or
37. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE L.J. 385, 390-92 (1977) (describing the various ways municipalities prevent all development in
certain areas).
38. Kristoffer Jackson, Do Land Use Regulations Stifle Residential Development? Evidence from
California Cities, 91 J. URB. EcON. 45, 54 (2016); see also Been, supra note 6, at 227-28.
39. See infra Section II.F.
40. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 649-50 (discussing the high public costs of public
schools). For an analysis of the interplay between fiscal land use decisions and public schools, see Eric
A. Hanushek & Kuzey Yilmaz, Land-Use Controls, Fiscal Zoning, and the Local Provision of
Education, 43 PUB. FIN. REv. 559, 563-67 (2015).
41. See Paul G. Lewis, Retail Politics: Local Sales Taxes and the Fiscalization of Land Use, 15
ECON. DEV. Q. 21,24-26 (2001) (arguing that the quest for retail development and its resulting sales tax
revenue motivates California's land use decisions).
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bans on multifamily housing, and other familiar, if troubling, forms of
exclusionary zoning. By requiring housing that consumes more land per
unit, a local government can reduce the amount of housing that can be built
in any area and also can increase the land costs associated with housing,
driving up prices. Admittedly, this dynamic has been shifting somewhat in
recent years. Changing consumer preferences means that dense, mixed-use,
multifamily development can sometimes be the most expensive, with new
high-rise areas in cities like Nashville generating by far the most net tax
revenue per square foot.42 Nevertheless, in much of the country and
especially in suburbs, the conventional wisdom still holds. Those places
still deploy large lot zoning and bans on multifamily housing in order to
exclude lower-income households and to attract and retain housing for the
affluent.43
F. ZOMNG FOR FEES
A more direct form of fiscal zoning comes from the bargaining
opportunity that land use regulations can represent. Several decades ago,
Professor Carol Rose demonstrated that zoning can be seen through the
competing lenses of planning and dealing.44 Under the dealing model, land
use regulations should be seen as a kind of opening offer. Developers then
must petition governments for more permissive regulations-like increases
in density-and provide certain financial or in-kind benefits in exchange
for regulatory largesse. Some people view this as a kind of graft, others
simply as a way of ensuring that developers internalize more of the costs of
increased density.45 Regardless, many local governments have become
increasingly sophisticated about enacting land use regulations that create a
framework for bargaining.
The most familiar example is the imposition of impact fees or
exactions. These are explicit mechanisms by which local governments
charge developers for the burdens of new development, either through
42. Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place:
Affordable Housing and Geographic Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667, 1684 (2013); SMART
GRowTH AM., FISCAL IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THREE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS IN NASHVILLE-
DAVIDSON COUNTY, TN 11 (2013), https://smartgrowthamerica.org/app/legacy/documents/fiscal-
analysis-of-nashville-develop ment.pdf (showing the tax revenue generated by the one high-rise area as
compared to two other developments).
43. Been, supra note 6, at 219-23.
44. Rose, supra note 3, at 882, 889-91.
45. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE 139, 143-47
(2005) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of development fees); Arthur C. Nelson,
Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, 26 URB. LAW. 541, 548-53 (1994) (addressing various
objections to development fees).
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prespecified legislated fees or ad hoc bargains.46 But other zoning
approaches also create bargaining moments for local governments. For
example, some local governments place large amounts of land into holding
zones, typically industrial or agricultural zones where no other uses are
permitted.47 These do not reflect the municipality's judgment about the
highest and best use for the property but instead create such strict limits
that anyone wanting to develop the property will have to seek a rezoning.
Since property owners are rarely entitled to rezonings as of right, this gives
municipalities discretion and so creates a meaningful opportunity to
bargain for developer contributions to infrastructure, and so forth.
More generally, then, zoning ordinances can generate revenue either
by imposing prespecified impact fees or by giving local officials discretion
in land use decisionmaking. Vague zoning standards-like a requirement
that development be "consistent" with existing community-allow local
officials to deny land use applications. 48 This discretion therefore also
allows officials to grant the applications but only upon certain concessions
or contributions by the developer.
G. ZONING TO INCREASE PROPERTY VALUES
According to Professor Fischel's leading account of suburbs and small
local governments, homeowners dominate the political landscape and are
primarily motivated by property values. 49 Most homeowners' primary asset
is their house, and so they are keenly interested in property values, seek
policies and regulations that will increase local property values, and reward
local politicians who provide them.
50
There is no magic zoning bullet that will automatically create higher
values. Instead, the relationship between zoning and property values is
dynamic and depends tremendously on local context. Nevertheless, it is
generally the case that restricting the supply of developable land will tend
to increase property values. In fact, it amounts to a kind of transfer from
new entrants who have to pay higher housing costs to in-place residents
46. See Jim Rossi & Christopher Serkin, Energy Exactions, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2019).
47. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Role of Economics in the Teaching of Land-Use Law, 1 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1,7 (1980).
48. See Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in
Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 337, 347-49 (2002) (noting the increasingly
discretionary practice of land use decisionmaking).
49. FISCHEL, supra note 20, at 18.
50. ld. at 5-6.
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who see their property values climb.5 1
This does not always work. Sometimes, depending on elasticity in
local markets, strict regulations can produce economic stagnation. If
demand for housing is weak or very responsive to price, then overly
restrictive zoning can be self-defeating. 52 But where demand is strong, as in
many affluent and developed communities, restrictions on supply can
increase property values for in-place property owners.
H. AFFORDABILITY
Not everyone benefits from rising property values. A countervailing
pressure in many municipalities is the desire to encourage more affordable
housing options. 53 Rents and home prices that are too high can drive out
important members of the community-like teachers, government
employees, artists, low-wage workers, and so forth-which can have
adverse economic effects and can also deplete social capital.54
Local governments have a number of tools at their disposal to address
housing affordability, but each comes with limitations. Obvious, but much
maligned, tools include rent regulation and the provision of public
housing. 55 But land use regulations can also be deployed to encourage
affordable housing. Inclusionary zoning, for example, offers developers
density bonuses in exchange for developing some number of affordable
units or sometimes requires a number of affordable units outright as a
condition for building. 56 More generally, too, simply increasing the supply
of any form of new housing can also put downward pressure on price. 57
Cities today are experimenting with ways of relaxing density limits in order
51. Vicki Been, "Exit'" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 483 (1991); Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out:
Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U.L. REV. 591, 625-26 & n. 162 (1998).
52. Been, supra note 51, at 504, 509 (discussing how one community's overly stringent
regulation may result in an otherwise beneficial development being taken to a community with better
regulatory policies).
53. See Been, supra note 6, at 227-29 (noting the contributions of restrictions on housing supply
to the lack of affordable housing options).
54. Steven J. Eagle, "Affordable Housing" as Metaphor, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301, 306-21
(2017) (discussing the diverse economic and social benefits of affordable housing); see also KEITH
WARDRIP ET AL., CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, THE ROLE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN CREATING JOBS
AND STIMULATING LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 10-13 (2011), https://providencehousing.org/wp-
con tent/uploads/2014/03/Housing-and-Economic-Development-Report-201 I.pdf.
55. Serkin, supra note 16 (offering a tentative justification for rent regulation).
56. For an overview of inclusionary zoning, see Cecily T. Talbert et al., Recent Developments in
Inclusionary Zoning, 38 URB. LAW. 701, 702-03 (2006).
57. See Vicki Been et al., Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply and Affordability, 29 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 25, 29 (2019).
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to increase the supply of new housing and thereby address affordability. In
2018, New York, for example, changed its off-street parking requirements
for certain kinds of buildings, dramatically increasing the number of
residential units that could be developed on any given lot.58 The most
extreme example is the Y~iMBY movement in California, which pushed for
a change in 2018 that would have all but eliminated density limits on
residential development anywhere near mass transit.59 This would have
unlocked an enormous amount of development potential throughout
California's cities. The measure failed, but there can be no doubt that
affordability is motivating increasing political pressure.
60
Not everyone agrees that unlocking development potential will help
with affordability. Indeed, it might seem that developing high-end market
rate housing would increase not decrease local housing costs. But the law
of supply and demand is powerful, and even market-rate housing eases the
demand for more modest existing housing elsewhere in the municipality
and so puts downward pressure on price. In 2019, Professor Vicki Been et
al. surveyed the economic literature and concluded that unlocking supply,
even without explicit inclusionary zoning requirements, helps make
housing more affordable, whereas supply restrictions drive prices up.6
1
While responses remain controversial and contested, zoning for
affordability involves lowering regulatory barriers, reducing development
restrictions and unlocking increased development potential, or directly
regulating price either through rent regulation or inclusionary zoning.
I. HISTORIC PRESERVATION
Although not squarely "zoning" in many places, historic preservation
can motivate local officials who seek to protect buildings or neighborhoods
of historic significance. Designating property as historically significant can
create a new layer of regulatory oversight. It therefore triggers a kind of
additional veto right that can make it more difficult to build.62 Historic
preservation ordinances vary in their details and in their strength but
58. N.Y.C., NY, THE ZONING RESOLUTION, art. II, ch. 5 (2018), https://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/
planning/zoning/access-text.page.
59. Benjamin Schneider, YIMBYs Defeated as California's Transit Density Bill Stalls, CITYLAB
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/califomias-transit-density-bill-stalls/558341.
60. See id.
61. Been et al., supra note 57, at 27-29.
62. See Vicki Been et al., Preserving History or Restricting Development? The Heterogeneous
Effects of Historic Districts on Local Housing Markets in New York City, 92 J. URB. ECON. 16, 17
(2016) ("We find that construction activity falls in districts after designation, as expected given the
rules accompanying designation.").
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generally require property owners to apply for a certificate of
appropriateness when seeking to tear down or modify a structure
designated as historically significant.63
J. COMMUNITY PRESERVATION
More than historic preservation, community preservation motivates a
significant amount of land use regulation. In fact, historic preservation is
often a kind of rough proxy for the real concern of preventing displacement
of the existing community. Development can threaten community in a
number of different ways. Most directly, an influx of new residents can
affect existing social ties and threaten existing social capital.64
Development can simultaneously price some residents out of the
neighborhood. 65 This gentrification-a perennial issue in local government
and land use law66-- creates its own winners and losers. The former
includes primarily in-place property owners; the latter includes renters.
Nevertheless, people concerned with preserving the existing in-place
community will usually object to development that changes the character of
a place. 6
7
Some local governments have begun to experiment with community
preservation directly, enacting community preservation ordinances that do
not require a showing of historical significance but rather community
significance to preserve a building.68 Most use zoning's blunter tools, again
seeking to restrict new development by erecting regulatory hurdles. While
this can sometimes prove self-defeating, creating stagnation and capital
flight, community members will often take that risk in order to protect their
63. For a description of zoning for historic preservation, see J. Dennis Doyle, Historic
Preservation Zoning in Maryland, 5 MD. L.F. 100, 101 -05 (1976).
64. See Catherine Hart, Community Preference in New York City, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 881,
905 (2017) (explaining that the influx of high-income individuals into low-income communities
"replaces local residents and deprives long-time residents of the stake they have built in their
community").
65. Been, supra note 6, at 242-44.
66. See SHERYLL CASHrN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION 324-27 (2004); Rachel D. Godsil,
The Gentrification Trigger: Autonomy, Mobility, and Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78
BROOK. L. REV. 319, 335 37 (2013) (discussing a more nuanced approach to gentrification).
67. The built environment is also important for community preservation, even independent of the
financial pressures that can come from gentrification. As Professor Carol Rose observed decades ago,
buildings can be important for constituting community, and indeed preservation efforts should be
evaluated to that end. See Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of
Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473,488-91 (1981).
68. See William A. Fischel, Neighborhood Conservation Districts: The New Belt and Suspenders
of Municipal Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 339, 347-49 (2013) (discussing community preservation
techniques other than those based on historic status).
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social capital and communities. There is no doubt that concerns about the
fragility of existing communities motivate a significant amount of
restrictive zoning.
K. AESTHETIC REGULATION
Today, in many places, the motivation for many land use regulations
appears to be as much aesthetics as anything else. Neighbors are concerned
about the impact of new development on the look of their neighborhood for
its own sake and often oppose development primarily because they think it
will be ugly.69
Sometimes, this concern is explicitly included in zoning ordinances by
requiring architectural review.7y Such architectural review provisions tend
to create greater homogeneity in building design, often specifying a narrow
list of appropriate architectural styles for any new buildings.
71
Homogeneity does not ensure beauty, of course, and can in fact create the
opposite. 72 But it is a proxy for uncontroversial buildings and so minimizes
aesthetic outliers.
Some jurisdictions have also turned away from traditional use-based
zoning ordinances to form-based codes instead. As their name implies,
these codes focus on the particular form that buildings can take-on bulk,
shape, and so forth-instead of on the permitted uses. These often impose
quite specific design requirements that function like de facto aesthetic
regulations.7
3
L. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
We have now long understood the important role that land use
regulations can play in climate change.74 Real estate development
69. See, e.g., Dan Grossman, Think Those Slot Homes in Denver Are Ugly? You 're Not Alone, 9
NEWS, https://www.9news.com/article/money/personal-fmance/real-estate/think-those-stot-homes-in-de
nver-are-ugly-youre-not-alone/73-490912391 (last updated Nov. 10, 2017, 2:44 PM) (discussing
Denver residents' aesthetic opposition to homes described as "Minecraft characters, Lego characters,"
and "robots").
70. See Shawn G. Rice, Zoning Law: Architectural Appearance Ordinances and the First
Amendment, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 439, 446-48 (1993) (discussing the ways that architectural appearance
ordinances can limit the aesthetics of communities).
71. Id. at 446 (describing architectural appearance ordinances as limiting "excessive
dissimilarity" and requiring "conformity" or "harmony" (citations omitted)).
72. See EDWARD SCISSORHANDS (20th Century Fox Dec. 6, 1990).
73. For a description of form-based codes, see NICOLE STELLE GARNETIr, HOOVER INST.,
UPSCALING THE NEIGHBORHOOD 18-32 (2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/upscaling
the-neighborhood revised final gamett 0.pdf.
74. For an overview of this dynamic, see generally David Markell, Climate Change and the
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contributes significantly to carbon emissions. The sprawl associated with
single-family residential suburbs is much more carbon intensive than dense
development closer to people's jobs and to commercial centers. 75
Energy conservation is a backdrop for many discussions about new
development. This can translate directly into land use regulation. Zoning
that minimizes sprawl and that encourages denser development near
transportation will lower carbon emissions.76 Indeed, this is the explicit
goal of sustainable development, which has generated an enormous amount
of zoning activity and scholarly interest. 77 The blueprint for sustainable
development remains contested, but experts broadly agree that urban living
produces much less carbon than suburban and rural living. They therefore
favor increasing density in the urban core while discouraging the land-
consuming sprawl that has characterized development for much of the past
century.7 8
M. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: ANIMALS AND HABITATS
A related motivation for land use regulation, especially in rural areas,
is more traditional environmental protection and specifically the protection
of environmental resources like wetlands. Wetland regulations are often
administrated at the state level, rather than the local level.79 Nevertheless,
they function as sometimes dramatic limits on development. Other kinds of
environmental regulations have a similar effect. Septic regulations can
prove more restrictive than zoning in controlling density in rural areas
without municipal wastewater.8 0 Explicit environmental review through the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") or its state analogues also
Roles of Land Use and Energy Law: An Introduction, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 231 (2012)
(discussing the effect that "land use, energy efficiency, and mobile and stationary source emission
reduction approaches" can have on climate change).
75. See REID EWING ET AL., SMART GROWTH AM., MEASURING SPRAWL AND ITS IMPACT 18-19
(2002), https://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/app/legacy/documents/MeasuringSprawl.PDF.
76. Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning: Greening State and Local Land
Use Plans and Regulations to Address Climate Change Challenges and Preserve Resources for Future
Generations, 34 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 121, 147-56 (2009) (surveying regulatory land
use techniques meant to increase sustainability).
77. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, An Environmental Understanding of the Local Land Use System, 45
ENVTL. L. REP. 10215, 10220-21 (2015).
78. Other kinds of less conventional responses are possible as well. For an example of one, see
Rossi & Serkin, supra note 46.
79. See George F. Gramling, III, Wetland Regulation and Wildlife Habitat Protection: Proposals
for Florida, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 377 78 (1984).
80. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 913 (2011) (discussing how building infrastructure with limited
capacity can be more controlling than zoning).
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shape large-scale development.81
Other municipalities focus environmental efforts on wildlife habitat.
The most sophisticated efforts involve taking an inventory of animal
pathways and then seeking to create habitat connectivity by preventing
development that interferes with those pathways.8 2 Wildlife overlay
districts seek to preserve critical habitat and to promote ecological health.
More often, however, local governments pursue what is better
characterized as aesthetic environmentalism. The goal is to promote a
community character that includes vegetation, trees, open space, and a
general sense of nature, regardless of the actual impact on wildlife or
natural resources. Proponents often object to cookie-cutter suburbs and
promote more large-lot development that preserves a more rural feel.
The result for zoning is increased restriction on development, but the
location for these restrictions is motivated by a concern for natural
resources and not by aesthetics, community character, and so forth.
N. ECONOMIC INTERVENTION
Zoning and land use controls can be an important if sometimes
problematic tool for local governments to affect economic outcomes. At the
most parochial level, land use regulations can be used as a kind of
economic protectionism for in-place businesses by excluding
competition. 83 Prohibitions on new entrants, coupled with grandfather
protection for existing businesses, can create a kind of regulatory mini-
monopoly. This can look like pure rent seeking or just naked economic
favoritism for in-place businesses.8 4  Sometimes, however, local
governments can justify anti-competitive zoning on broader economic
grounds. For example, some local governments have tried to use zoning
and land use controls to exclude large box stores like Wal-Mart, ostensibly
to preserve smaller businesses and downtown commercial areas, and the
positive externalities they generate. 85
81. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 349 (2004) (arguing
that environmental-informative requirements function as regulatory penalties, creating incentives to
upgrade environmental standards early in projects).
82. Critical Paths for Vermont Wildlife, NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, https://www.nwf.org/Our-
Work/Habitats/Wildlife-Corridors/Northeast (last visited May 12, 2019).
83. See, e.g., Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council of Livermore, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304,
309 (Ct. App. 1977); Sprenger, Grubb & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Hailey, 903 P.2d 741, 748-49 (Idaho
1995).
84. See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 466-67 (7th Cir. 1988).
85. A downtown commercial district may generate significant positive effects, which a big-box
store at the edge of town can threaten. See Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement's
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Local governments can also use zoning to pursue specific economic
goals. For example, noncumulative zoning in industrial areas is best
understood as a kind of subsidy for industry by keeping property values
lower for industrial land.86 In other instances, local governments can create
what amount to aspirational zones for uses they seek to attract-like New
York City creating a new biomedical zone. 7 And even more broadly, local
governments may use land use regulations to try to generate agglomeration
surplus through a sufficient density of a particular kind of business or
industry: think, here, of tech in Silicon Valley; insurance in Hartford,
Connecticut; theater on Broadway; and so forth. 88 These places and
industries may all have their own specific land use needs, and local
governments are often especially solicitous of these industry-driven zoning
requirements.
89
0. EXCLUSION AND SEGREGATION
In addition to the more-or-less principled justifications for land use
regulation identified above, there are also more overtly pernicious ones that
are important to acknowledge. Zoning can be used to exclude disfavored
groups or businesses. This is most obvious and familiar in the context of
racially motivated zoning. Although explicitly race-based zoning is clearly
unconstitutional and illegal, exclusionary zoning often has a racially
discriminatory impact, if not motivation. Because this can be so difficult to
detect and to prove, it remains widespread. 90 For example, opposition to
affordable housing or simply to less expensive multifamily housing may
well be motivated for some people by racial animus.9 1 The political fights
Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1927, 1948-52
(2007).
86. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative Zoning
to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249,253-56 (2010) (acknowledging the
prevalence of the use of noncumulative zoning for these purposes but ultimately arguing against it).
87. TRANSWESTERN, NEW YORK CITY LIFE SCIENCE MARKET 5 (2017), https://download.trans
westem.com/public/Media/NY-Life-Science-Outlook_2Q2017.pdf.
88. See Roderick M. Hills & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV.
91, 115-16 (2015) ("Many cities have no adequate substitutes, because they create agglomeration
economies that rivals cannot duplicate.").
89. Broadway enjoys a special zoning district. For an interesting overview of New York's zoning
code, see Allison Meier, How Zoning Laws Shaped New York City over the Last Century,
HYPERALLERGIC (Dec. 14, 2016), https://hyperallergic.com/341092/mastering-the-metropolis-mcny.
90. See Donald J. Smythe, The Power to Exclude and the Power to Expel, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
367, 397-99 (2018) (analyzing the continued use of exclusionary zoning by local governments).
91. See, e.g., Timothy J. Choppin, Breaking the Exclusionary Land Use Regulation Barrier:
Policies to Promote Affordable Housing in the Suburbs, 82 GEO. L.J. 2039, 2054 (1994)
("Discrimination, both racial and economic, is one reason suburban residents oppose affordable
housing.").
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over such housing are therefore often accompanied by charges of racism
and can be bitter and ugly.
9 2
Table 1 summarizes the different municipal goals described in this
Section and the resulting implications for zoning.
92. See Mick Dumke, Amid Affordable Housing Dispute, Conservatives Seek a Home on the
Northwest Side, CHI. SUN-TIMES (May 23, 2018, 10:48 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/
affordable-housing-chicago-northwest-side-gp-conservative-repubicans-nrthwest-side-jefferson-
park-illinois-policy-institute (describing a political fight over a proposed affordable housing project in
Chicago).
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TABLE 1. The Uses of Zoning
Local Goal Land Use Objective Zoning Approach
Minimizing harms
from neighbors
New urbanism
Encouraging
growth
Discouraging
growth
Fiscal Zoning
Zoning as
bargaining
Zoning to increase
property values
Affordability
Historic
preservation
Community
preservation
Aesthetic
regulation
Environmental
protection:
carbon
reduction
Environmental
protection:
animals and
habitats
Economic
Intervention
Exclusion and
segregation
Segregating incompatible uses
Encouraging transit-oriented and
mixed-use development
Reducing zoning and regulatory
barriers to development
Increasing regulatory barriers to
development
Discouraging uses that have a
negative revenue impact
Imposing impact fees and creating
bargaining moments requiring
discretionary approvals
Reducing supply of developable
property
Increasing housing supply and
increasing density and multifamily
housing
Preventing destruction of older
structures and preserving historical
character of neighborhoods
Maintaining existing social capital
and community ties
Maintaining or enhancing the look
and feel of an area
Increasing density, reducing
building size, and reducing vehicle
miles traveled
Preserving open space and critical
habitats
Pursuing a particular economic
outcome
Keeping out unwanted people and
businesses
Traditional use-based zoning
Encouraging density and
combined residential and
commercial uses in
prespecified areas
Relaxed zoning restrictions
Density limits and other
regulatory hurdles
Density limits to exclude
multifamily housing
Density limits and creation of
discretionary approvals
Density limits and other
regulatory hurdles
Relaxed zoning restrictions
and the creation of
inclusionary zoning regimes
Strengthened zoning
restrictions and historic
preservation rules
Strengthened zoning
restrictions and other
regulatory hurdles
Aesthetic regulation, historic
preservation, and form-based
codes
Encouraging density
Large-lot zoning and
preservation of designated
environmental resources
Industry-specific zoning
Strengthened zoning
restrictions
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What should be immediately apparent is the extent of convergence in
the resulting approaches to zoning, even as land use objectives continue to
diverge. Clearly, Table 1 obscures, through simplification, important limits
on the extent of convergence. New urbanists, for example, will not favor
relaxed zoning restrictions in all of the same places, or in the same way, as
environmentalists. Nor are these interests mutually exclusive, even in the
same person or political body. Someone can prioritize aesthetic concerns in
one place and affordable housing in another in the same municipality.
There is nothing inherently inconsistent in those views.
Indeed, questions of location and scale create persistent tensions in
each of these approaches. Increased density in one place might increase
property values but make other parts of the municipality more affordable.
Local renters who might fird themselves priced out of that particular
neighborhood might therefore object, even though the effect of increased
supply is to improve affordability. 93 Similarly, favoring density, transit-
oriented development, or a more urban mixed-use streetscape does not
mean favoring those elements everywhere. They can conflict with concerns
over historic or community preservation in particular locations in ways that
are not internally inconsistent.
III. EVALUATING MULTIMODAL CONVERGENCE
A. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DIVERGENCE
The diverging goals of land use regulations-and the resulting
property and development rights that they circumscribe-create both costs
and benefits. They also create new political alliances that can make the real
stakes of zoning fights increasingly opaque. Being clear eyed about these
dynamics allows for a more careful assessment of the changing landscape
of land use regulations.
The most obvious cost of the proliferation of land use goals comes
from the difficulty in navigating divergent regulatory regimes. When
zoning codified the straightforward goal of separating incompatible uses of
property, it was relatively easy for property owners and developers to
anticipate ahead of time what uses would be permitted on any particular
property. Comprehensive plans gave a sense of the municipality's
preferences and priorities, while the zoning ordinance prescribed broad
categories of uses and densities that it would allow. A developer seeking to
build new multifamily housing or a new commercial center would look for
93. See Been et al., supra note 57, at 25-27.
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property with the right physical and regulatory characteristics to decide
what land to buy and where to develop. And this process was relatively
transparent.
Divergence in land use goals can obscure some of zoning's signaling
and channeling functions. Today, the content of the zoning ordinance does
not necessarily reveal the municipality's underlying purposes and goals and
so can make the regulatory treatment of land more opaque. The fact that
property is zoned as agricultural, for example, does not necessarily mean
the municipality is hostile to development there. It might mean, instead,
that local officials are open to a rezoning for a price. 94 Likewise, the fact
that development will require a normally routine special use permit, or a
less routine variance, does not mean a developer should expect to get it if
the development will occupy land that local officials believe is important
for habitat or the local officials are simply opposed to growth. In other
words, divergence in the underlying purposes of land use regulations-
especially in specific locations within a municipality-means that it can be
difficult for property owners and developers to know ahead of time what
uses will be permitted in any particular place. The contours of property
rights and development potential are therefore rendered at least partially
obscure.
Divergence in land use regulations creates another cost, too, in the
form of special interest group rent seeking. 95 Support for-or opposition
to-some land use approval can now include special interest group
pressure from many different directions. Those interventions are costly
themselves, but they can also create a more complex and less transparent
set of choices for local officials. The results can be less effective
regulations, whether judged by efficiency, by public preference, or any
other metric.
There are benefits of the seeming divergence, however. Most
importantly, multiplicity in land use regulations can allow people to better
satisfy their individual preferences by choosing to live in a place that
pursues their particular regulatory priorities. And they will not always
choose to live in the place where their property rights are the most
94. See Rose, supra note 3, at 862-63, 897; see also Melanie Yingst, Commission OKs Rezoning
of Properties, TROY DAILY NEWS (June 14, 2018), https://www.tdn-net.com/news/43184/commission-
oks-rezoning-of-properties (discussing an Ohio local zoning commission's decision to rezone two
agricultural properties to allow residential development of the area).
95. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986) (discussing interest-
group rent seeking).
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expansive. Indeed, it is quite to the contrary. While no one likes to be told
what they can and cannot do on their own property, almost everyone likes
being able to tell neighbors what they can do on theirs. Many people will
willingly trade greater restrictions on their own land for equivalent
restrictions on their neighbors. The proliferation of common interest
communities, many of which are subject to much more burdensome
property restrictions than any local zoning ordinance would ever impose, is
proof that many people prefer this trade-off.96 Just as people can choose to
live in a place with good public schools, or low taxes, or mass transit, or
lots of open space, regulatory priorities can be important selection criteria
for homeowners.
Relatedly, satisfying consumers' regulatory preferences facilitates
Tieboutean sorting.97 This has structural benefits. Desirable regulatory
regimes will be capitalized into property values, at least to some extent.
That provides an important feedback mechanism for local governments
seeking to satisfy consumer preferences. Where regulatory choices are
limited to the binary options of "more" or "less," price becomes an
unhelpful or even perverse signal. More regulation will tend to restrict
supply and so drive up prices, all else being equal. The pressure from
sorting will always favor more restrictive zoning. But in a world of
multimodal convergence, where local governments pursue a variety of
regulatory objectives, sorting starts to generate meaningful price signals in
property values. For example, the fact that many local governments have
sought to brand themselves as "green" cities, partly through their land use
regulations, demonstrates at least their perception of the benefits of such
sorting.9
8
In theory, then, the proliferation of attitudes towards land use
regulations, as well as the regulations themselves, should allow for
consumers to satisfy their regulatory preferences and to purchase the
bundle of property rights that they want. To the extent they are visible to
outsiders-sometimes an unrealistic assumption-land use priorities allow
for more efficient sorting. 99
96. See Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with
Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 833 (1999)
(arguing that the proliferation of common interest communities demonstrates their appeal).
97. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 417-20
(1956).
98. See Denise Ryan, The $31b "Green" Branding of Vancouver, VANCOUVER SUN (Jan. 31,
2016), http://www.vancouversun.com/business/green+branding+Vancouver/1 1686117/story.html.
99. See Tiebout, supra note 97, at 418.
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The tension between predictability and clarity in property rights on the
one hand and satisfying diverse preferences on the other creates a
meaningful limit on the goals that local governments should be able to
pursue and how they pursue them. Too much divergence and information
costs become too high. But too little and more people will be stuck in
regimes that do not actually reflect their interests. Multimodal convergence
therefore represents a surprisingly appropriate compromise between the
certainty of unidimensional land use goals and more chaotic divergence. It
also means that not everyone in a municipality must agree on the same
goals to still be able to agree on an approach to zoning. The fact that
different substantive goals can produce the same attitude towards zoning in
a particular dispute means that more people can satisfy their regulatory
preferences with fewer options.
This is not to say that the extent of the observed divergence that exists
today is appropriate. It may be too great, and so the information costs are
already too high. Or it may not be enough, and people are being forced into
regulatory regimes that do not satisfy their preferences. This is,
fundamentally, an empirical question, and one that would require further
exploration to try to resolve. The observation here is simply that some
degree of divergence is desirable, and that multimodal convergence reflects
a kind of tacit compromise between an overly rigid set of land use goals
and a regulatory free-for-all.
Multimodal convergence also provides a useful way of thinking about
political alignments and narratives in contemporary land use fights. It
explains why many land use disputes today involve such unlikely
bedfellows. For example, the motives of the growth machine and
affordable housing advocates may be very different, but their view of
zoning may be quite consistent.' 00
These dynamics also make it more difficult to understand the "real"
stakes of many land use disputes. Does opposition to multifamily housing
in a particular place come from concern about habitat loss, from aesthetic
preferences, or from racist opposition to the likely low-income residents
who are predicted to move in? Any of those views would be consistent with
a vote against the new development.
The purpose of highlighting these dynamics is not, ultimately, to favor
one over another. Appropriate concerns in one place may be entirely
inappropriate somewhere else. But bringing awareness to the diversity of
100. Serkin, supra note 2, at 13-15.
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goals that can be implicated by modem land use disputes should allow for
more explicit evaluations of the trade-offs in any zoning decision. Even if
the motivation for restrictive zoning is aesthetic, for example, it is
important to recognize the impact on affordability. Conversely,
encouraging growth may help affordability or create opportunities for
agglomeration, but with the possibility of burdening infrastructure beyond
what it can easily support and displacing in-place local residents.
But these dynamics do reveal that different groups sometimes end up
advocating for land use regulations against their expressed interests. These
groups are either being disingenuous about their actual motivations or are
mistaken about how different substantive policies translate into land use
regulation. The survey of land use goals in the previous part makes it easier
to identify these unexpected positions and to explore alternative
explanations.
B. AN EXAMPLE: NASHVILLE'S MUSIC Row
Consider a recent land use fight in Nashville, Tennessee. There is
nothing particularly special about this example. Indeed, its point here is its
banality-if interesting local color. Nor does it implicate every different
interest identified above. But it does reveal the complicated goals of
modem land use controversies.
Nashville's Music Row is two long, multiblock streets near and
roughly parallel to the campus of Vanderbilt University. Its name comes
from the many recording and music studios located along these long
strips.10 1 The buildings, however, look residential and are an eclectic
hodgepodge that includes craftsman-style bungalows from the first half of
the twentieth century, some modem buildings, and a few small office
buildings. Increasing development pressure, however, has led to the
redevelopment of many of these music-industry uses into new apartment
buildings.1" 2 This has led to heated conflict over the future of Music Row,
101. See Jessi Maness, The History of Music Row: 60 Years of Greatness, SPORTS & ENT.
NASHVILLE (Oct. 13, 2015), http://sportsandentertainmentnashville.com/the-history-of-music-row-60-
years-of-greatness.
102. See, e.g., Michelle C. Kroft, Show Your Support Help Save Music Row at the Rally the Row
Event July 24th., HIST. NASHIVLLE, INC. (July 16, 2018), http://historicnashvilleinc.org/show-your-
support-help-save-music-row-at-the-rally-the-row-event-july-24th [https://perma.cc/UVK8-R89Z]
("Since 2013, 43 buildings with music industry connections have been demolished-most to make way
for apartment buildings."); see also Margaret Renkl, The Day the Music Died, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/opinion/nashville-music.html (outlining the gentrification
of Music Row).
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by preservationists. But historic preservation is an awkward fit because
many of the buildings are not historical in any way. The historic
preservationists are focused less on the buildings than on the musical
history that they represent. In fact, it appears that their interests are not
about preserving the architecture but are instead about preserving the music
industry more broadly. One preservationist, for example, articulated the
agenda this way: "We can't just sit back and let Nashville's unique history
be destroyed and its present-day musical culture lost."' 6
Other opposition to development appears to be more about preserving
the community's character than about any historic resources. 107 One
longtime bartender said of the development on Music Row: "It's not
Nashville anymore. It used to be a little place, with a little airport, that had
some fantastic music and big personalities and millions of different stories.
Now it's a metropolis, this is a big city. 10 8 Others have focused their
opposition on the associated infrastructure burdens and, in particular, on
traffic.'0 9 Indeed, traffic has become a flashpoint in Nashville. There is no
consensus about how to address it, but many people oppose all new
development until a plan is in place.'
10
106. Jessica Nicholson, National Trust for Historic Preservation and Historic Nashville to Hold
Rally the Row Event, Music Row (July 20, 2018) (quoting Carolyn Brackett, Senior Field Officer,
National Trust for Historic Preservation), https://musicrow.com/2018/07/national-trust-for-historic-
preservation-and-historic-nashville-to-hold-rally-the-row-event [https://perma.cc/2DR2-6QU6]; see
also id. ("We have to act now to save this place that is iconic and historically priceless." (quoting Trey
Bruce, Vice President, Historic Nashville)).
107. See, e.g., NASHVILLE METRO. PLANNING DEP'T, Music Row DETAILED PLAN app. (2016)
[hereinafter Music Row DETAILED PLAN], https://www.nashville.gov/Portals/0/SiteContent/Planning/
docs/MusicRow/Music%20Row/o2ODetailed%2OPlan%2ODraft%20Recommendations withAppendi
x.pdf (Survey 1 Responses Organized by Question) (listing comments from survey respondents about
preserving Music Row, including: "To me, the individual buildings create an overall feel that binds the
community. It's humble and full of character.").
108. Nikki Junewicz, Historic Buildings in Danger in Music Row Redevelopment Proposal, FOX
17 NASHVILLE (May 20, 2018) (quoting Jonathan Long, local bartender), https://foxl7.com/news/localU
historic-buildings-in-danger-in-music-city-row-redevelopment-proposa [https://perma.cc/1HDK4-
RGL3].
109. See Music Row DETAILED PLAN, supra note 107, at app. ("GROW[TH] SHOULD NOT
OCCUR BY BUILDING .... That would only worsen the traffic and will be less inviting for
tourism."); see also E-mail from John Dotson, Parks Broker, e-Pro, to Planning Commissioners (Dec. 6,
2016, 11:40 AM), https://www.nashville.gov/document/1D/cdd7797e-led5-49c7-8e20-7fc9ef4fd8a9/
December-8-2016-public-comments-received-through-December-7 ("We are most concerned about
traffic, parking and infrastructure.").
110. See, e.g., MUSIC Row DETAILED PLAN, supra note 107, at app. (commenting the following
on getting around Music Row: "[I]nfrastructure should be considered BEFORE approval of millions of
square feet of new construction, not after."). Cf Hiroko Tabuchi, How the Koch Brothers Are Killing
Public Transit Projects Around the Country, N.Y. TiMES (June 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/19/climate/koch-brothers-public-transit.html (discussing the support and opposition for a new
transit plan in Nashville and other cities across the United States).
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Finally, additional opposition comes from community groups who
worry about affordability.11 ' Any new construction in and around Music
Row is likely to be very expensive. Many people worry that any new
housing will be unaffordable, and that this will displace current residents.
Housing costs in Nashville have been skyrocketing, putting particular
pressure on affordable housing. According to one study, Nashville has lost
18,000 affordable housing units since 2000, and 44% of Nashville renters
are housing-cost burdened.' 12 Opponents of new development often focus
on affordability as a central objection. 113
On the opposite side are developers who see a significant financial
opportunity in the Music Row redevelopment. 1 4 Their interests are
predictable. But the City also sees a substantial fiscal upside. Not only does
new development generate more property tax revenue, but also its net fiscal
impact is even more positive. Where dense urban infill has occurred
nearby, the net tax revenue per square foot is dramatically higher than
anywhere else in the metro area because of the relatively low cost of
building out infrastructure and the high property values. 1 15 This, coupled
with the City's generally lax approach to land use regulation, makes
redevelopment of Music Row appear all but inevitable, despite the interests
aligned on the other side. Whoever wins, the controversy seems entirely
predictable and conventional.
111. See OFFICE OF THE MAYOR MEGAN BARRY, HOUSING NASHVILLE: NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON
COUNTY'S HOUSING REPORT 11-12, 40-42 (2017) [hereinafter NASHVILLE HOUSING REPORT],
https://www.nashville.gov/Portals/O/SiteContent/MayorsOffice/AffordableHousing/Housing%2Nashvi
lle%20FINAL.pdf; see also MUSIC Row DETAILED PLAN, supra note 107, at app. (commenting the
following concerning how to strengthen the Music Row community: "Affordability. Nashville can't
chase out all of us median income people .... ").
112. NASHVILLE HOUSING REPORT, supra note 111, at II, 16.
113. See David Plazas, The Costs of Growth and Change in Nashville, TENNESSEAN,
https://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/columnists/david-plazas/20 17/0 1/29/costs-growth-and-
change-nashville/97064252 (last updated Jan. 10, 2018, 6:50 PM) (discussing how the development
boom in Nashville has led to increasingly high housing costs); Stephen Trageser, Music Row
Development and Neighborhood Character, NASHVILLE SCENE (Sept. 25, 2018 3:00 PM),
https://www.nashvillescene.com/news/pith-in-the-wind/article/2102408 I/music-row-development-and-
neighborhood-character ("[W]ith Nashville real estate prices as high as they are today, the chances of
[neighborhood business] finding a comparable spot nearby seem slim.") (discussing the pressure to
develop Music Row and its effect on existing businesses).
114. Staff Reports, Music Row Project Lands $12.8M Permit, NASHVILLE POST (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.nashvillepost.com/business/development/article/20999454/notes-music-row-project-lands-
128m-permit (reporting that a development company has obtained a permit to build a Music Row office
building expected to be worth $35 million).
115. SMART GROWTH AM., supra note 42, at 10-11 (analyzing the significantly positive fiscal
impact and tax benefit of the Gulch, a dense infill development, compared to two other Nashville
developments).
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A closer look at the stakes, however, reveals a more complicated
dynamic, and one that is increasingly representative of modem land use
fights. Consider, first, the effect on traffic: a central source of opposition.
This is a perplexing reason to oppose redevelopment. Music Row is
adjacent to Vanderbilt and in the heart of the City. Yes, new residential
buildings will increase local traffic to some extent, but it should marginally
reduce traffic in the City more broadly. It is not exactly transit-oriented
development since there is no meaningful transit in Nashville. But it is
development that is closer to the places people work and play and so will
result in fewer vehicle miles traveled. Traffic has a lot of political valence,
and it makes tactical sense for opponents to use it as a reason to push back
against development, but it seems misguided as a basis for objecting new
buildings on Music Row. For this same reason, those concerned with
sustainable development should favor dense infill in places like Music Row
over suburban sprawl. This also reduces development's total carbon
footprint.
Increased housing costs citywide are also a poor reason to oppose the
redevelopment of Music Row. While new housing may well precipitate a
change in the character of the particular neighborhood and increase prices
there, the best evidence demonstrates that adding supply will decrease
median property values in the City and increase affordability. This is true
even if the new housing stock is exclusively market rate and expensive.
Such is the power of supply and demand. 16 Opposition to new
development by immediate neighbors on grounds of affordability is rational
if parochial-what Professor Been has labeled "City NIMBYs."
117
Opposition based on concerns about housing costs throughout the city
makes little sense.
There are countervailing peculiarities on the other side as well.
Focusing on the fiscal impact of redevelopment, tax implications are only
part of the story. Many business leaders and politicians have argued that it
is in Nashville's economic interest to preserve the music industry. 
18
116. See Emily Hamilton, Three Lessons from Nashville 's Building Boom, MARKET URBANISM
(Apr. 27, 2018), http://marketurbanism.com/2018/04/27/three-lessons-nashvilles-building-boom
("While there's no way to legislate that great music will continue to come out of Music Row, the best
way to make Nashville a good place for up and coming artists is to allow for new housing construction
that will allow affordable neighborhoods to stay that way.") (arguing that development has kept rents in
other neighborhoods more affordable).
117. See Been, supra note 6, at 242-43.
118. See Patrick Sisson, On a Mission to Preserve Nashville's Music Row, MERIDIAN,
https://www.meridian.net/tennessee/2016/1 1/10/13592846/nashville-live-music-row (last visited May
12, 2019) (describing the outsize impact Music Row has had on Nashville's economy).
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Preventing redevelopment of Music Row means that music studios do not
need to compete with residential developers and so amounts to a kind of
subsidy for the music business. There are agglomeration economies that
come from the clustering of music studios in one particular area: musicians
and songwriters frequently collaborate throughout the day, musicians
record together, industry executives meet and do business in person up and
down Music Row.' 19 And, as traffic problems worsen throughout the city,
the value of spatial proximity is only increasing.
Yes, market pressures demonstrate that the property is more valuable
as residential or mixed-use development. Putting the property to a higher
and better use unlocks value, by definition. However, the music industry
produces significant benefits-positive externalities-for the City as a
whole and should perhaps be preserved for that reason. It generates
significant economic activity and also creates a kind of identity that attracts
businesses and residents. If those benefits exceed the marginal value of
redevelopment, then the City has a fiscal reason to subsidize the industry
and prevent redevelopment, even if that means missing out on some
increased tax revenue.
None of this reveals what the right answer is for Nashville. But it does
demonstrate how the stakes of modem land use and zoning fights often go
far beyond the traditional proregulation and antiregulation camps. It also
reveals how different groups' interests do not converge around any singular
goal. Instead, different constituencies are motivated by very different
underlying goals. Ultimately, people choose to live, to work, and to invest
in Nashville for very different reasons. Some like the small-city feel of the
place, others the music industry, still others the statewide emphasis on
property rights and economic liberties, and others the appealing and new
housing stock in increasingly dense mixed-use neighborhoods. But
ultimately, these are all different views that can be reflected in different
land use policies. Allowing Nashville to make decisions about which goals
it will prioritize will give voters and property owners the opportunity to
pursue or protect those aspects of the city that they most want.
119. See CAROLYN BRACKETT & RANDALL GROSS, NAT'L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., A NEW
VISION FOR MUSIC Row 15 (2016), https://www.nashville.gov/Portals/O/SiteContent/Planning/docs/
MusicRow/Music%20Row/ 20Recommendations%20Report/20April%202016.pdf ("Like in the early
days of Music Row, many industry leaders and participants still walk between offices and meet up for
lunch, networking, contracting, or collaboration.").
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Anitha Cadambi, LL.B., LL.M., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Alexander M. Capron, B.A., LL.B., University Professor, Scott H. Bice Chair in
Healthcare Law, Policy and Ethics, and Professor of Law and Medicine
Elizabeth A. Carroll, B.S., J.D., Professor of Lawyering Skills, and Director of Legal
Writing and Advocacy Program
Michael A. Chasalow, B.A., B.A., M.B.A., J.D., Clinical Professor of Law and Director,
Small Business Clinic
Catherine Coleman, A.B., J.D., Professor of Lawyering Skills and Director of Academic
Support
Geoffrey Cowan, B.A., LL.B., University Professor of Journalism, Communication and
Law
David B. Cruz, B.S., B.A., M.S., J.D., Professor of Law
Bryant Danner, B.A., J.D., Visiting Professor of Law
Judy K. Davis, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Samuel C. Erman, A.B., J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Law
Susan R. Estrich, B.A., J.D., Robert Kingsley Professor of Law and Political Science
Anna Faircloth Feingold, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law and Supervising
Attorney, Post-Conviction Justice Project
Niels W. Frenzen, B.A., J.D., Sidney M. and Audrey M. Irmas Endowed Clinical
Professor of Law and Director, Immigration Clinic
Hannah R. Garry, B.A., Graduate Certificate in Forced Migration Studies, M.A., J.D.,
Clinical Professor of Law and Director, International Human Rights Clinic
Thomas D. Griffith, A.B., M.A.T., J.D., John B. Milliken Professor of Taxation
Ariela J. Gross, B.A., M.A., J.D., Ph.D., John B. and Alice R. Sharp Professor of Law
and History
Sofia Mary Gruskin, B.A., J.D., M.I.A., Professor of Preventive Medicine and Law;
Director, USC Institute for Global Health
Cynthia Guyer, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Sarah Hall, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law and G&IP Career Advisor
Diana C. Jaque, B.A., M.A., M.L.I.S., J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Gregory C. Keating, B.A., M.A., J.D., Ph.D., William T Dalessi Professor of Law and
Philosophy
Orin S. Kerr, B.S.E., M.S., J.D., Frances R. and John J. Duggan Distinguished Professor
of Law
Edward D. Kleinbard, B.A., M.A., J.D., Robert C. Packard Trustee Chair in Law
Daniel M. Klerman, B.A., J.D., Ph.D., Edward G. Lewis Chair in Law and History
Lisa Klerman, B.A., J.D., Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Mediation Clinic
Bart A. Kosko, B.A., B.A., M.A., J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Electrical Engineering and
Law
Rakel P. Larson, B.A., M.S., M.A., Ph.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
George Lefcoe, B.A., LL.B., Ervin and Florine Yoder Chair in Real Estate Law
Martin L. Levine, B.A., J.D., LL.D., UPS Foundation Chair in Law and Gerontology,
and Professor of Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences
Sharon A. Lloyd, B.A., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, Law and Political Science
Rebecca S. Lonergan, B.A., J.D., Professor of Lawyering Skills, and Associate Director
of Legal Writing and Advocacy Program
Dorothy S. Lund, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
Thomas D. Lyon, B.A., J.D., Ph.D., Judge Edward J. and Ruey L. Guirado Chair in
Law and Psychology
John G. Matsusaka, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Business, Law and Political Science;
Senior Advisor to the Dean, Marshall School of Business
Edward J. McCaffery, B.A., M.A., J.D., Robert C. Packard Trustee Chair in Law and
Professor of Law, Economics and Political Science; Visiting Professor of Law and
Economics, California Institute of Technology
Claudia Moatti, Ph.D., H.D.R., Adjunct Professor of Classics and Law
Paul J. Moorman, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Kevin J. Murphy, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Business, Economics and Law
Clare Pastore, B.A., J.D., Professor of the Practice of Law
Brian Peck, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Transnational
Law and Business Center
Jef Perlman, B.S., M.Eng., J.D., Visiting Professor of Law and Interim Director,
Intellectual Property & Technology Law Clinic
Richard Peterson, B.S.L., J.D., LL.M., M.D.R., Adjunct Professor of Law and Senior
Director of Experiential Education
Jonathan Quong, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy and Law
Brian M. Raphael, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Robert K. Rasmussen, B.A., J.D., J. Thomas McCarthy Trustee Chair in Law and
Political Science
Jean Lantz Reisz, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law and Supervising
Attorney, USC Immigration Clinic
Alison Dundes Renteln, B.A., M.A., J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Political Science and Law
Camille Gear Rich, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law and Sociology
Stephen M. Rich, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Laura Riley, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Experiential
Learning Programs
Daria Roithmayr, B.S., J.D., George T. and Harriet E. Pfleger Chair in Law
Heidi L. Rummel, B.A., J.D., Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Post-Conviction
Justice Project
Emily Ryo, B.A., J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Law and Sociology
Elyn R. Saks, B.A., M.Litt., J.D., Ph.D., LL.D. (Hon.), Orrin B. Evans Distinguished
Professor of Law, Psychology, and Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences
Wayne Sandholtz, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Professor of International Relations and Law
Hilary M. Schor, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Professor of English, Comparative Literature,
Gender Studies and Law
Donald Scotten, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of the Practice of Law
Michael H. Shapiro B.A., M.A., J.D., Dorothy W. Nelson Professor of Law
Michael Simkovic, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law and Accounting
Dan Simon, LL.B., M.B.A., LL.M., S.J.D., Richard L. and Maria B. Crutcher Professor
of Law and Psychology
Karen Skinner, B.A., J.D., M.S., M.L.S., Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law
Nomi M. Stolzenberg, B.A., J.D., Nathan and Lilly Shapell Chair in Law
Franita Tolson, B.A./B.S., J.D., Professor of Law
Gary Watson, B.A., Ph.D., Provost Professor of Philosophy and Law
Mark I. Weinstein, B.S., M.S.I.A., M.B.A., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Business and
Law
Simon J. Wilkie, B.Commerce, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Economics, Communication
and Law
Abby K. Wood, B.A., M.A.L.D., J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Law, Political
Science and Public Policy
Susan C. Wright, B.A., J.D., Professor of Lawyering Skills and Assistant Director of
Academic Support
LAW LIBRARIANS
Pauline M. Aranas, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Associate Dean, John Stauffer Charitable Trust
Chief Information Officer, and Director of the Law Library
Leonette M. Williams, B.A., M.S.L.S., Associate Director of the Law Library for
Collection and Administrative Services
Brian M. Raphael, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Assistant Director of the Law Library for Public
Services
Judy K. Davis, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Senior Law Librarian, Head of Access Services
Cynthia Guyer, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Senior Law Librarian, Research Services
Diana C. Jaque, B.A., M.A., M.L.I.S., J.D., Senior Law Librarian, Head of Collection
Development and Acquisitions
Paul J. Moorman, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Senior Law Librarian, Research Services/Foreign
and International Law
Wendy Y. Nobunaga, B.A., M.L.S., Senior Law Librarian, Head of Cataloging
Karen Skinner, B.A., J.D., M.S., M.L.S., Senior Law Librarian, Research Services
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
Robin Maness, B.A., M.S., Associate Dean of Development, Alumni Relations and
Continuing Legal Education
Stephen D. Rose, B.A., J.D., M.B.A., LL.M., Chair, Tax Institute
Cynthia Lock Tregillis, B.A., J.D., Chair, Intellectual Property Institute
Susan J. Booth, B.A., J.D., M.B.A., Co-Chair, Real Estate Law and Business Forum
Phillip G. Nichols, B.A., J.D., Co-Chair, Real Estate Law and Business Forum
Glenn A. Sonnenberg, B.A., J.D., Co-Chair, Real Estate Law and Business Forum
Bruce M. Ramer, A.B., LL.B., Chair, Institute on Entertainment Law and Business
Kenneth S. Wolf, B.A., J.D., Chair, Trust and Estate Conference
Andrew D. Garelick, B.S., J.D., Co-Chair, Institute for Corporate Counsel
Steven B. Stokdyk, B.A., J.D., Co-Chair, Institute for Corporate Counsel
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